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Abstract
Despite the repeated claim by eminent students of economic growth that
scientists and inventors have contributed to economic development, no study
has yet quantified this effect using the rich historical record of great minds.
Introducing a novel database of per capita researchers, we show that the his-
tory of research activity (corrected for geographical biases) predicts economic
growth over the long run better than any other established growth predictor,
and that this predictive power, while subject to swings, has been consistently
increasing through time over the long run. These conclusions are drawn after
presenting a number of facts suggesting that forces exogenous to income and
population growth have determined how intensively countries have engaged
in research. In contrast to a large body of literature, we find that property rights
and schooling have been of minor importance for research and for economic
growth through modern history. Our estimated dynamic impact of researcher
densities on economic growth are very consistent through a variety of sam-
ples and regressions, based either on cross-sectional or on time-series variance.
Permanently doubling the number of researchers per capita had barely an im-
pact in 1800, but today its impact might be an increase of annualized economic
growth rates of almost 1% in a 20-years span.
Keywords: Economic growth, long run, science, research, education, institutions.
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1 Introduction
Many students of economic growth have put research as the primary cause of eco-
nomic development over the long run.1 However, the empirical literature of long-
term economic growth has not yet made use of the vast biographical data on “great
minds” of science and technology to explore the degree to which it can help us
understand two of the most important questions in economics: the beginning of
modern economic growth and why some countries are much richer than others.
The aim of this paper is to fill this gap and investigate how the emergence of re-
searchers through history in distinct places is associated with subsequent economic
outcomes.2 To do so, we constructed a comprehensive database of birthdates and
1According to Simon Kuznets, “since the second half of the nineteenth century, the major source
of economic growth in the developed countries has been science-based technology.” (Kuznets, 1966,
p. 10). Joel Mokyr has famously elaborated on this idea. For him, it was during the Age of Enlight-
enment that the seeds of modern economic growth were laid by the conviction among the intellec-
tual elite that applied science was conductive to prosperity (Mokyr, 2002). Angus Maddison wrote
once that, among all “societal, intellectual, and institutional changes that had taken place over the
preceding four centuries”, the “most fundamental” precondition for modern economic growth was
“the recognition of the human capacity to transform the forces of nature through rational investiga-
tion and experiment” (Maddison, 1991, p. 52). Dominant formal growth theory, inspired by Romer
(1990), has an R&D sector acting as the engine of economic growth. See also Jones (2005) on the role
of knowledge creation for economic growth.
2There have been various attempts to quantify scientific and intellectual activity across time (e.g.
Gascoigne, 1984, 1992; Mokyr, 2005; Murray, 2003). Yet, surprisingly, the effect of intellectual activity
on GDP based on the record of great minds has been, to the best of our knowledge, only studied by
Jakob Madsen and coauthors in a series of recent works (Madsen, 2013; Madsen and Murtin, 2015;
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birthplaces of noticeable researchers out of DBpedia, a repository containing meta-
data from Wikipedia, which we show to be consistent with authoritative sources
of the history of science in its time-series dimension as well as in its cross-country
dimension, yet preferable to other sources due to its scale, homogeneity, continu-
ity, and international coverage. We took advantage of the continuity of the data
to present day in order to estimate and apply a correction against underrepresen-
tation of non-Westerners and non-English-speakers, avoiding—or at least substan-
tially diminishing—the common bias that affects cross country biographical data.
Our analysis of the data confirms a number of claims of the economic history
literature and provides a quantitative perspective of them. Additionally, it unveils
a number of hitherto obscure, yet striking facts on research and its relationship with
economic growth. We hope that these facts should substantially enrich the debate
on the deep causes behind long-term economic growth and international income
inequality.
The first big question to be addressed in this paper relates with causality. It is
well known that wealthier countries tend to be those which spend more on research
in our days, measured as expenditures over GDP or as researchers per capita. Does
the causality just run from income per capita to researchers per capita, as happens
with most variables that correlate with income? Or does the causality run in the
opposite direction as well?
A few simple, yet powerful facts illuminate this question. One is that a large
number of countries have not experienced changes in the number of researchers
per capita since modern economic growth started: Most European nations and ex-
colonies experienced their major changes of researchers per capita between 1500
and 1820, i.e. before modern economic growth began; Japan underwent its great in-
crease of researcher as a direct result of the Meiji Restoration, thus also prior to its
modern growth regime; and the selected group of other successful countries that
climbed through the international research ranking once modern economic growth
was already underway—South Korea and Norway, for example—are exceptions to
the fact that the number of researchers per capita was established for most coun-
tries before the, so called, “great divergence” of income across the world, despite a
dramatic increase in standards of living.
Later changes, which are comparatively much minor than those observed within
1500-1820, are neither correlated with economic growth. For instance, it is well
known that the US, France, and Germany have grown at very similar rates during
the last 100 years. Yet, the number of researchers per capita has grown in the US,
has fallen in Germany, and stayed constant in France.
Hence, research has not been driven by income. On the contrary, we found that
income has indeed responded to research.
An example of these dynamics is provided by the European industrialization
experience. Focusing on Europe has the advantage that the data on researchers is
much richer and more reliable than that of other parts of the world. Additionally,
Madsen and Yan, 2013) which focus either on Britain alone or on a small subset of countries during
the pre-modern-growth period.
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dealing with Europe alone is a way of overcoming any sort of bias that may result
from the underrepresentation of non-Western researchers. That said, what makes
Europe particularly interesting is that its geographical distribution of researchers
changed dramatically between 1500 and 1820 along episodes such as the Reforma-
tion and the Counter-Reformation, which abruptly shifted intellectual activity out
of southern Europe and strengthened research in other parts of Europe, especially
in Britain. These episodes lead to a distribution of researchers per capita by 1820 (by
1700 it was already partially established) that did not only determine what would
be the distribution of researchers in the centuries to come, but what would be the
future distribution of income as well. In other words, a variety of events not partic-
ularly related with income or population—perhaps related to religion above all—
gave shape to a distribution of researchers in Europe by 1820, and that distribution
predicts which countries are more or less wealthy today.
A similar story can be told for the worldwide sample. As in the European case,
we found that there have not been major changes in the relative distribution of
researchers per capita since 1820. Actually, it has been relatively stable since the
Renaissance (only with the late ascent of Japan would the Western research envi-
ronment be rivaled again). And the current dispersion of income across the world
turns out to be strongly correlated not just with the researcher density of 1820 but
with that of the 15th century as well.
Why could researchers from so long ago matter for current income levels? The
geographical distribution of researcher densities has been persistent over the very
long run. Therefore, 18th century researchers per capita, for instance, act as a proxy
of the researcher densities during later years, and the researcher density in a mo-
ment of time is probably a proxy of the sort of human capital needed for the adop-
tion and implementation of “complex” technologies in an economy. In this sense,
the density of researchers can be thought of as causal of different economic devel-
opment across the world.
In sum, when the long term is analyzed the following conclusions on causality
emerge. First, what drives research to rise and fall historically is not known for
sure, but income is definitively not a first order determinant of research. Second, the
high contemporaneous correlation between income and research observed today
can be seen as the result of historically and “exogenously” given researcher densi-
ties: countries with high or low numbers of researchers per capita experienced more
or less modern economic growth respectively.
Ruling out causality going from income to research as a major force has tremen-
dous implications for our interpretation of the data. One implication has to do with
a fact that has received little attention so far: the number of recorded researchers
worldwide has exhibited remarkably constant growth since the 18th century. On
a first glance one would have interpreted this as the result of economic growth.
However, in light of the evidence that points to causality running from research to
income, this constancy might be behind the fact that the frontier economies have
experienced almost constant income growth rates since the modern growth regime
began, consistently with theoretical growth models that exhibit diminishing returns
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to knowledge (Jones, 2005).
Another implication of (almost purely) monodirectional causality is that it al-
lows us to estimate the impact of research on the economy econometrically without
the need of instrumentalization and all the uncertainty derived from such approach.
So, how much has research mattered for long-term economic growth? To answer
this question we relied on a variety of econometric estimates that allowed us to
construct a coherent interpretation.
First we regressed 2005 log income per capita in a cross section of countries with
respect to the number of per capita researchers born in previous centuries (15th
to 19th centuries, respectively), controlling for initial income and other covariates.
Irrespective of the century of the right hand side variables, we found an income
elasticity of about 33% with respect to past per capita researchers. This means that
having doubled the number of researchers per capita centuries ago—no matter ex-
actly when—is associated with per capita income today which is about one third
larger. These regressions have a large R2. Indeed, regressing log 2005 income with
respect to the 19th century researcher density alone produces an R2 of 0.7, suggesting
that research has been a major determinant explaining today’s international income
inequality.
Then, to better understand the evolution over time of the relationship between
international income inequality and research we run rolling cross-country growth
regressions with the initial number of per capita researchers as one of the explana-
tory variables. Not satisfied with cross sectional estimates alone—after all, our cor-
rection of the biases could be inadequate—, we cross-checked our estimates of the
impact of researcher densities on later economic growth with panel data regressions
immune to (time-invariant) cross-sectional biases, obtaining results that are equiva-
lent to our cross-sectional estimates.
We found that the closer we get to the present, the stronger the impact of his-
torical research on economic growth. Before the modern growth regime began, it
was not significantly different from zero. Yet, since the Industrial Revolution the
mean of the impact has been consistently on the rise. Now, for example, a country
that had doubled its number of researchers per capita two decades ago, is since then
experiencing a long-term per capita income growth rate that is about 1% greater. In
contrast, a country which doubled its number of per capita researchers 200 years ago
would have experienced on average 0.1% higher economic growth, so that income
today would be about one third larger than without having doubled the researcher
density two centuries ago, just in line with our regressions based on income levels
instead of growth.
And last, we run cross-country, rolling regressions with income in a variable year
as dependent variable but holding fixed the density of researchers (say that of the
17th century) and controls. The result is remarkable. We found that the more time
passes, the more the international distribution of income resembles that of historical
researcher densities of the 19th, 18th, 17th, 16th, and even 15th century. So, for
example, the researcher density of the 17th century is more closely associated with
per capita GDP of 2005 than with per capita GDP of, say, 1930. In other words we
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could say that history matters more every year. How can this fact be explained?
We interpret it to be the result of two forces previously mentioned: first, a strong
persistence in the cross-sectional distribution of researchers per capita; and second,
a growing impact of researchers on economic growth.
What can we say about mass schooling and Northian institutions, the two main
predictors of economic growth proposed by the empirical literature during the last
decades? Our estimates are robust to the inclusion of them, but their impact gets
eclipsed when researcher densities enter the regressions. Literacy ratios do not pre-
dict early industrialization—a well known fact.3 But also the impact of schooling
on later development surprisingly vanishes when competing with research capa-
bilities. Constraints to the executive may still play a role for economic growth, we
found. But the Glorious Revolution is definitively not associated with a subsequent
improvement of British research output. Actually, British research took advantage
over continental Europe many decades before the Glorious Revolution.
Our work is related with that of students of the theory of economic growth that
have put research at the center of the modern growth engine.4 It is also related
with the empirical literature on the sources of economic growth and international
income inequality in general and with the economic return of research in particu-
lar.5 Recent works with results similar to ours include Mokyr (2016), who argues
that a culture which fostered research and innovation emerged in parts of Western
Europe due to the lower censorship of novel thinking compared to other parts of
the world, Squicciarini and Voigtländer (2014), who find that early French industri-
alization of cities is not much related to broad education (literacy and schooling) but
significantly related to scientific elite education (proxied by subscribers to the Ency-
clopédie), Vidal-Robert (2014), who finds that in regions of Spain where the Inquisi-
tion was more active economic growth and attitudes towards innovation have been
negatively affected until modern times, and Bénabou et al. (2015b) and Bénabou
et al. (2015a), who find a negative relationship across the world between innovation
and religiousness.
In order to facilitate the reading of this fairly large study we highlighted our
assumptions, the empirical facts, and the conclusions drawn from them. The struc-
ture of our work is as follows. Section 2 presents the database and explains the
adjustment we applied as correction against regional and linguistic biases affecting
3See Allen (2003) and Squicciarini and Voigtländer (2014).
4Among many others, these include Mokyr (2002), Jacob (1997), Goldstone (2009), and Landes
(2003) in economic history, and Arrow (1962), Kuznets (1966), Romer (1990), Grossman and Helpman
(1993), and Aghion and Howitt (1992) in growth theory. Critiques of the science-based theory of
industrialization during its early phase can be found in Clark (2012), Allen (2009), and Temin (2014).
5A recent review of empirical literature on the economic return of research can be found in Hall
et al. (2010). The empirical literature on the sources of long term growth is too vast to be fairly
reviewed here. Important recent insights are that international income inequalities are very long-
lasting (Comin et al., 2010) and closely associated with genetic distance of a nations’ population
(Spolaore and Wacziarg, 2014). Acemoglu et al. (2001) triggered a large literature devoted to studying
the role of institutions for long-term development. However, this literature has been subject to much
critique (Glaeser et al., 2004, Ogilvie and Carus, 2014). Jones (2015) reviews recent findings of the
growth literature with emphasis on the role of Northian institutions and (static) misallocation.
6
the historical record of researchers. Section 3 presents our empirical findings, and
section 4 concludes. Details on the database can be found in the appendix.
2 The Data
To study how creators of useful knowledge may have affected the economy we
need birthyears and birthplaces of influential researchers through history. The data
must be unbiased towards specific countries or regions, it has to be generated by a
homogenous process through time and space, and it has to be sufficiently large to
cover the entire world back to periods preceding industrialization.
It is not obvious how to construct such a database. The history of science has
been written overwhelmingly by Westerners. Therefore, virtually every source will
be biased towards the West. And an important part of the detailed accounting of
great minds is divided in catalogues constrained to fields, eras, geographical re-
gions, ethnic groups, or even gender. Merging Joseph Needham’s volume of Chem-
istry and Chemical Technology in “Science and Civilisation in China” with Roshdi
Rashed’s chapter on historiography of “Encyclopedia of the History of Arabic Sci-
ence”, and keeping a homogenous quality of researcher out of such combination, is
a task well beyond our capabilities.
We opted instead for a simple but fruitful approach: we downloaded all re-
searchers appearing in DBpedia (a repository containing structured metadata gath-
ered from the English version of Wikipedia), filtered out erroneous data, compared
resulting cross country measures with official statistics and historical sources, and
corrected for biases of underrepresentation. The definition of researcher we em-
ployed corresponds to a person engaged in work aimed at increasing the stock of
what one might call, in terms of Kuznets (1966), “useful knowledge”. More pre-
cisely, we included people engaged in all branches of theoretical and applied sci-
ence, technology, mathematics, and philosophy (excluding religious studies).
While certainly imperfect in fine detail, DBpedia provides a vast amount of
information—about 40.000 researchers with birthdate and birthplace, 16.000 of them
born prior to the 20th century, a number larger than that of scientists in authoritative
sources like Gascoigne (1984) or the Dictionary of Scientific Biography—, including
researchers from almost every corner of the planet and all fields considered useful
by society. Also, researchers accounted in it should have contributed to the stock of
knowledge in sufficient degree as to “deserve” a Wikipedia page. This—after con-
trolling for geographical biases—should provide a metric that is comparable across
countries in a given time.
We found that an appropriate geographical bias-correction of the number of re-
searchers per capita can be achieved with
Adjusted log researchers p. c.t = Unadjusted log researchers p. c.t
+ (100−% English speakers)× 0.0125 (1)
where the number 0.0125 corresponds to the average of columns (2) to (7) in panel
C of table A2, which is discussed in the appendix. We will refer to this adjustment
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as the English-correction. Unfortunately, reliable statistics on the number of En-
glish speakers are available only for a small subset of countries, mainly in Europe.
Therefore, we will use this correction for analyzing the European case alone.
When making comparison among countries of the entire sample we will em-
ploy an alternative, suboptimal (less precise), correction instead. It is based on the
residuals of the following regression.6
DBpedia log researchers p. c.t = const. + NSF log articles p. c.t
+ residualt, t = 1986, . . . , 2000 (2)
These capture the average degree of over or underrepresentation in DBpedia with
respect to the density of scientific articles per capita according to the National Sci-
ence Foundation (NSF).The adjusted metric, to which we will refer to as NSF-correction,
is thus
Adjusted log researchers p. c.t = Unadjusted log researchers p. c.t
− average residual of (2) . (3)
An important assumption is made in both corrections. Namely, that the degree
of under or overrepresentation of a country’s researchers is the same that we ob-
serve in recent times, no matter if we are dealing with researchers from the 20th or
from, say, the 18th century. This assumption will certainly fail to produce reason-
able statistics for periods which go back too far. Societies such as the Maya or the
Phoenicians let almost no trace of their scientific achievements, and that losses are
certainly not accounted by the correction here proposed. But we will risk assuming
that they hold as a valid approximation since the modern period or, at least, since
1820. We will hence state this assumption in two forms.
Assumption 1. Countries with underrepresented researchers in DBpedia in recent decades
also suffer from the same proportional underrepresentation through time . . .
a) . . . since the 15th century. (Strong form of assumption 1)
b) . . . since 1820. (Weak form of assumption 1)
We will work with assumption 1a in order to make use of the data back to the
15th century. However, the important results should hold if 1b alone is true.
A detailed account on the construction of the dataset and on how it compares to
alternative sources can be found in the appendix.
6The relative lack of precision has to do with a high variance of the residuals. For instance, Portu-
gal and Spain, or Sweden and Denmark, despite having similar economies and cultures, may appear
with very different correction factors. Nonetheless, the correction is important to rule out a bias
against underrepresented countries or regions, as it is clearly the case for East Asia.
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3 The Facts
3.1 From stagnation to steady-growth in research
Figure 1 shows the worldwide evolution of what we will henceforth refer to as the
“number of researchers”: the number of researchers aged 20 to 70, including de-
ceased ones.7 We cannot say much about the number of researchers prior to 1400.
Figures are inevitably imprecise for such remote dates and world aggregates are
hard to interpret in the “unglobalized” society that was in place before the great
voyages. But one point seems safe to make: prior to the 15th century there were few
researchers and there was almost no growth trend in the aggregate series.
This stands in sharp contrast with what we see after around 1720. The dotted
line in the figure indicates a 1.58% growth trend which almost perfectly fits the
series of aggregated researchers. This magnitude may not tell us too much, because
it might be that the data is subject to “depreciation”—older researchers appearing
less in the historical record than more contemporaneous ones, meaning that this
growth rate might be an overestimation. What is clear, however, is that the number
of researchers worldwide has been growing in a steady-state fashion since the onset
of industrialization.8
Fact 1. In contrast to pre-modern times, the number of famous researchers as a world ag-
gregate has been increasing since the Renaissance. It has so in a steady-state-looking fashion
since the early 18th century.
What drives and what implies a constant growth rate of researchers? At a first
glance, one obvious candidate explaining constant research growth is that income
and (hence also) population have grown during the modern growth regime. The op-
posite, more provocative, interpretation is that rather income and population have
grown as a consequence of research growth. The theoretical underpinning for such
possibility is laid down clearly in Jones (2005), where it is proposed that the growth
rate of a frictionless knowledge-absorbing economy must be proportional to the
growth rate of the number of researchers in the world.9
Conjecture 1. The constancy of growth of worldwide famous researchers has not been
caused by constant economic growth. The causality goes in the opposite direction.
7Correction (3) is applied in this case. The uncorrected data has an almost indistinguishable
shape. We chose 20 and 70 as upper and lower bounds for two reasons. First, almost all famous
researchers have produced their contributions within these ages (see e.g. Jones et al., 2014). Second,
while most researchers were productive in their thirties (we could have chosen 30 to 40 as cutting
points, for instance), using a narrow age interval would lead to a high variance in the time series
for early dates or countries with few researchers. In contrast, an index of researchers aged 20 to 70
provides a smooth metric which can be more sensibly employed in econometric analysis.
8This pattern is found in various other databases of scientists as well (see Gascoigne (1992) and
our data appendix).
9In such case one may conjecture that the constancy of growth among industrialized economies
(which is about 2% p. a.) is due to constant growth of the total number of influential researchers,
with an implied elasticity larger than unity if 1.58% is an upper bound for the actual growth rate of
researchers.
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Empirically, one way to show that conjecture 1 is indeed a possibility, is to find
that the growth rate of researchers is not primarily determined by income and pop-
ulation growth.
Figure 1: Steady growth of researchers worldwide
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Sources: Own computations out of DBpedia.
quitar adjustment del grafico
3.2 Research and income: what causes what?
Today countries with more income per capita have more famous researchers. One
interpretation for this correlation is that causality goes from higher income per
capita to more research output, because higher living standards are associated with
higher productivity and permit to sustain larger proportions of the population in
“unproductive” activities such as research. In Malthusian societies—where pro-
ductivity gains are eventually transformed into population growth—the number of
researchers is expected to grow at the same rate that the overall population does:
more people means higher chances of someone coming up with a good idea. And
in modern economies we expect both, population and income to be causal of more
researchers. Is what we see in figure 1 simply the result of these two mechanisms—
income and population growth stemming out of unexplained productivity growth?
The answer is no.
Figure 2 shows in log scale the number of researchers in Europe and the so-called
Western Offshoots—the US, Canada, Australia and New Zealand—through time
and compared to the worldwide number of researchers shown previously. Apart
from the fact that this group of Westerners has dominated the world of famous re-
searchers since the 16th century (previously it was at around 25%, in line with its
10
Figure 2: It has happened before!
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share of total population), the most interesting fact is that researchers of the Euro-
pean Renaissance grew at an even higher rate than that observed after 1750. We
know well that neither population nor income grew at modern rates during the
Renaissance. Hence, population and income cannot be the main determinants of
research output.
Fact 2. During the European Renaissance the number of famous Western researchers grew
at rates similar to those observed during the modern growth regime.
The notion that researchers are proportional to the overall population—an as-
sumption usually to be found in the literature—is also refuted by the data. As
shown in figure 3a, the ratio of famous researchers to overall population—the “den-
sity of researchers”—has not been constant through history. It also does not seem
that income has driven the rising ratio of researchers over population, because that
would imply a structural brake when modern growth began. Rather, we observe
rising growth of per capita researchers since the late middle ages.
Fact 3. Over time, the number of worldwide famous researchers per capita has neither been
constant nor proportional to living standards.
Since research growth has been primarily a Western phenomenon, figure 3b
restricts the aggregation to the 12 core West European countries 10 and the West-
ern Offshoots. One could have expected to find similar developments of research
among them since they experienced similar standards of living. Yet, we can state
the following.
10Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Italy, Netherlands, Norway, Sweden,
Switzerland, United Kingdom.
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Figure 3: Researchers per capita
(a) Worldwide (logscale)
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Fact 4. Since about 1870, the density of researchers has been constant in Western Europe,
while in the US it grew considerably during the 20th century .
The development of researcher densities and income is shown at the country
level in figure 4. It shows, for a number of selected economies, GDP per capita in
the vertical axis and the number of famous researchers per capita in the horizontal
axis, both in logs. If research would be primarily a function of income, then we
would expect it to follow income dynamics. The most likely form of the figures
would resemble that of Korea, with both income and research rising, or with in-
come rising first and then research catching up. But what we observe for a large
number of countries is the opposite, as for instance shown in the case of Sweden: an
inverted-L form indicates that the number of per capita researchers rose at almost
stable per capita income, and that income then rose at an almost stable number of
researchers per capita. Most countries exhibit some variant of this inverted-L form,
with researchers per capita reaching either some relatively stable number before
modern economic growth started (like for France and Italy), a gentle increase (like
for the US and Norway) or even a decrease (like China, India, and Germany) during
the modern growth phase. It is research that changed before income, not the other
way around.
Fact 5. The density of researchers in a country was largely determined before the modern
growth regime began
Facts 2, 3, 4, and 5 let us conclude the following.
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Figure 4: Per capita income and researchers since 1400
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ulation from Maddison (2010). Population was interpolated for countries with have observations
between 1500 and 1820. Per capita GDP estimates are from Maddison (2010).
Conclusion 1. The number of researchers in a country has been exogenous to income and
population, in the sense that these variables have not been first order determinants of it.
What, then, has determined the distribution of research around the world? A
look at what happened in the onset of research growth in Europe should help us to
find an answer.
3.3 The renovation of Europe’s research landscape
In figure 2 we saw that after 1400 something special happened to the worldwide
sum of researchers, which from then on was primarily driven by developments in
Europe and its offshoots. And in figure 4 we saw that the per capita number of
researchers was determined mostly before modern growth began at around 1820.
So what can we learn from this crucial period which precedes the modern growth
regime?
Figure 5 presents in log scale the number of researchers aged 20-70 between 1300
and 1930 in a group of major European nations, corrected by the current share of
13
English speakers as discussed previously. Figure 6 presents the same data in per
capita levels.
colocar en el eje "y" researchers
At a first glance, one can observe that these countries experienced notable het-
erogeneity in their evolution of research activity across time. But if one focuses on
the developments prior to 1570, it seems that all nations where taking part of a pan-
European Renaissance, with rising numbers of researchers. This was not population
driven, as evidence in figure 6.
This situation came to a sudden end in the second half of the 16th century:
France, the Netherlands, and Spain experienced abrupt declines in the number
of researchers and witnessed substantial differences in their future developments.
Italy and Germany entered periods of stagnation that lasted centuries. On the other
hand, the United Kingdom was the only European power which maintained an al-
most uninterrupted rising trend from 1500 to 1700.
Why this intellectual divergence happened during this period is a challenging
and important question to which we might not risk give a conclusive explanation.
However, given the synchronism of slowdown and decline of researchers in conti-
nental Europe during the late 16th century, it is tempting to link this phenomenon
with the religious and political turmoil of the time. As argued by Mokyr (1990, p.
76):
The Reformation, and its natural sequel the Counter-Reformation, made
Europe a more bigoted place than it had been since the Crusades: Gior-
dano Bruno was burned by the Catholic Inquisition, Miguel Servetus by
its Calvinist counterpart in Geneva. Throughout Europe in the sixteenth-
and early seventeenth centuries, the authorities’ patience for people who
thought for themselves and were critical of dogma was wearing thin.
[. . . ] In southern Europe, which came increasingly under the domina-
tion of the reactionary power of the Counter-Reformation, the climate
for technological creativity changed for the worse.
Placing the Reformation, the Counter-Reformation, and the violence associated
with them at the center of the intellectual atmosphere seems to be consistent with a
number of facts observed in figures 5 and 6.
First, the slowdown of Germany coincides with the beginning of the Counter-
Reformation in 1545. It was only after the Thirty Years War (1618-1648) that the
number of researchers began a slow but progressive recovery.
Second, Italy had experienced the devastation of its north during the Italian Wars
(1494 - 1559)—what seems to have had impact on its research activity—, but its
number of researchers began to decline continuously since the second half of the
16th century, suggesting that the Roman Inquisition—founded 1543 and lasting un-
til 1808, being particularly repressive during the second half of the 17th century (see
Mokyr, 2007, footnote 39)—, might have something to do with it.
Third, the French Wars of Religion—which extended from 1562 to 1598—coincide
14
to some extent with a sudden decline in researchers in that country.11
Fourth, Italy and Germany, but to some extent also the Dutch Republic and ar-
guably even France, where politically fractionalized regions, what made the “sup-
pression” of influential intellectuals “by the ruling orthodoxy and vested interests
more difficult” (Mokyr, 2007).12 This might explain why these countries did not ex-
perience a collapse of researchers similar to that of highly centralized Spain, where
the Inquisitional tribunal had “de facto power on all Spanish territories” (Vidal-
Robert, 2014).
Fifth, the fall of Spanish researchers seems to be consistent with the timing of
inquisitional repression. Table 1 presents the number of trials during distinct pe-
riods of Spanish inquisitional activity. The data distinguishes trials against other
religions (Jews, Muslims, and Lutherans) and trials against Catholics, accused of
blasphemy and superstition, among other charges. This is the kind of persecution
which one expects to have been more detrimental for the rise of progressive think-
ing in science and philosophy. While accounting just 6% until 1520, from then on
trials against Catholics made most of total trials afterwards. The number of these
trials per year was particularly high between 1570 and 1620, coinciding with a stark
decline of Spanish researchers in figure 5.13
Table 1: Trials of the Spanish Inquisition
Period
1478 - 1520 1520 - 1570 1570 - 1620 1621 - 1700 1701 - 1808
Total trials 5865 6502 13874 9881 3946
Against other religions 5251 2446 6055 3859 1136
Against Catholics 351 4056 7819 6022 2810
in percentage 6% 62% 56% 61% 71%
by year 8.4 82.8 159.6 76.2 26.3
Notes: Trials against Catholics include charges of bigamy, blasphemy, superstition, fornication, and
acts against the Inquisition, among others. Source: Own computations based on Vidal-Robert (2013).
Sixth, recent econometrical work by Vidal-Robert (2014) has shown that geo-
graphical areas within Spain where the Inquisition was more active experienced
less urbanization and population growth afterwards, and that these regions cur-
rently have more conservative opinions towards scientific advances. Also Bénabou
et al. (2015b,a) have recently found a negative relationship between religiosity and
11To have an idea of the scale of this event, the total deaths during the French Wars of Religion
“has been roughly estimated at between two and four million” (Knecht, 2002, p. 91).
12“[F]ragmentation of power was as prevalent within states as between them. For one thing, power
was divided between central authorities, provincial estates, and local courts. In Germany and Italy,
of course, this had become formalized, but in other ’states’ such as the Dutch Republic, the central
government had little power.” (Mokyr, 2007, p. 25, original emphasis).
13Between 1621 and 1700 the density of researchers remained stagnant, while the number of trials
against Catholics per year was similar to that observed between 1520 and 1570, with relatively stag-
nant researchers as well. Then, after 1700, the number of trials declined and the density of researchers
increased.
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innovation (patents per capita) across states of the US and across countries, suggest-
ing that religion might has played a role in determining attitudes towards research
(and eventually income levels) systematically through history.
It should be noted that revisionist work on the Roman and Spanish Inquisitions
has argued that the role played by the Inquisition shaping the differential develop-
ment of science in Europe has been overstated [Kamen (2014), Tarrant (2014)]. But
was it? In light of the evidence presented so far a deeper reassessment of this issue
seems necessary.
And seventh, Britain, which was almost untouched by the religious turmoil af-
fecting continental Europe, did indeed not experience any comparable reduction in
its number of researchers.
Summing up we might propose the following interpretation.
Conjecture 2. Intellectual intolerance during the Reformation and Counter-Reformation
had long-lasting negative effects on the density of famous researchers in some European
countries.
How accurate this interpretation really is for interpreting the evolution of re-
search densities needs to be proven. It is hard to believe that the intellectual history
of Europe between the 17th and the 18th can be explained by a simple story. The
case of the Netherlands is particularly puzzling. Why did research output decrease
that much relative to other parts of northern Europe? Some historians have already
pointed to this question. “It is striking”, Mokyr (2000) wrote, “that in the great
advances in chemistry and physics in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth cen-
tury, Dutch names play less of a role than one would have expected by virtue of the
country’s numbers of literate, urban people.” According to Jacob (1997), the reason
behind this phenomenon is to be found in the lack of interest that both, the Dutch
private sector and the Dutch government, had in the development of science. But
why did the Dutch had little interest in science?
Be it as it may, we can surely state the following.
Fact 6. In Europe, the cross-country relative distribution of researchers per capita experi-
enced drastic changes between 1550 and 1820. Some regions of Northern Europe, especially
Britain, emerged to dominate the research landscape during this period meanwhile Southern
Europe fell behind.
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Figure 5: Log researchers in selected countries
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Notes: The number of researchers in each country is adjusted according to the English-
correction as discussed in section 2.
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3.4 European industrialization
Between 1550 and the beginning of modern economic growth, which we might date
to 1820, the research landscape in Europe was largely transformed. How does this
resulting distribution of researchers relate to the process of industrialization that
unfolded afterwards? And—before answering that—can the direction of causality
between research and economic growth be identified?
To answer both questions we must start by noticing that while the distribution of
researchers across Europe changed dramatically between 1550 and 1820, as shown
in figure 7a, the relative distribution of living standards did not. This is shown in
figure 7b, where different markers denote whether the data is from either the origi-
nal work of Maddison (2010) or from revisions of 2013, so that the reader can infer
which differences may be due to the underlying data construction methodology. We
see that the British Industrial Revolution was already underway, the Dutch had lost
its naval hegemony and Italy had been rampaged by civil wars and invasions. Yet,
these are exceptions to the fact that, in general, the relative distribution of income
across Europe remained mostly that of the ancien régime until 1820.
Figure 7: Changes between 1500 and 1820
(a) The research landscape changed dramatically
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(b) . . . meanwhile GDP remained relatively stable
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Fact 7. Between around 1500 and 1820 the European relative distribution of researchers
changed dramatically while the relative distribution of income remained relatively stable.
Naturally, this tells us that how many researchers per capita a country had was
not strongly correlated to how much income it produced. This is shown more
clearly in figures 8a and 8b, where we see a positive but very disperse relationship.
Fact 8. Prior to the modern growth regime, the European cross-country correlation between
per capita researchers and per capita GDP was weak.
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Figure 8: Researchers vs. contemporaneous income
(a) Researchers vs. GDP around 1500
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(b) Researchers vs. GDP in 1820
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While during ancien régime—that long period which we might date between 1500
and 1820—relative income across European countries remained static, the scenario
started to change dramatically once modern economic growth flourished around
1820. As shown in figure 9a, by 1913, after just one century of modern growth, for-
merly backward Switzerland, as well as Germany, France, Austria, and Denmark
rapidly started to approach British standards of living. Meanwhile, Southern Eu-
rope fell behind. Indeed, in figure 9b we see that—except for Belgium—the resulting
income distribution of 1913 closely mimics that of researchers back in 1820.
Figure 9: GDP and research distribution in Europe since modern growth began
(a) Relative income changed between 1820-1913
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(b) . . . reflecting the researcher density of 1820
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QUitamos unos graficos de aca
The understand the argument consider the results of table 2. Panel A of the table
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presents the results of the following cross sectional OLS regressions:
ln(pcGDP 1913)− ln(pcGDP x)
1913− x = const. + ln(researchers p.c. x)β1
+ ln(pcGDP x)β2 + (Maddison 2010 dummy x)β3 + residual,
quantifying how economic growth from 1500, 1600, 1700, and 1820 to 1913, respec-
tively, is predicted by the initial researcher densities after controlling for initial in-
come and a dummy indicating the source of GDP.
In column (1) we see that the predictive power of the researcher density of 1500
is statistically indistinct from zero. Yet, in columns (2) and (3) we find that the re-
searcher densities of 1600 and 1700 have some predictive power of economic growth
up to 1913. And in column (4) we see that researchers per capita very strongly pre-
dict economic development up to 1913. How do we interpret these results?
We may first turn to Panel B of the table, which presents the OLS slope coefficient
of
ln(researchers p.c. 1913) = const. + ln(researchers p.c. x)β+ residual.
In column (1) we see that the relationship is very weak between researcher densi-
ties of 1500 and 1913, meaning little persistence of relative research activity across
Europe. It is stronger and more precise in columns (2) and (3), taking 1600 and 1700
as staring dates respectively. And it is very strong in column (4), meaning that be-
tween 1820 and 1913 the relative distribution of researchers per capita across Europe
remained rather stable.
This stability suggests a first interpretation of the results of panel A. Not old re-
searchers but contemporaneous researchers do facilitate economic growth. Yet, the
stability of researcher densities through time makes it appear as if older researchers
matter.
Alternatively, older researchers may do matter, in the sense that they permeated
society with “cultural” traits conductive to growth, perhaps through the education
system or through a high valuation of researchers by the society. Be it as it may:
Fact 9. In the cross section of European countries, the number of researchers per capita in
1820 is positively associated with early industralization.
But why should European countries with a more research-oriented culture had
grown more than others? After all, knowledge is (at least partly-) non-rival. Hence,
if we want to explain economic development, who (which country) invents or dis-
covers new productive knowledge does not matter; it rather matters who (which
country) is able to adopt the new ideas.
We believe, though, that the ratio of researchers over population acts as a proxy
of both, technological creation capabilities and technological adoption capabilities of
a society. The first point is obvious. The second has to do with the kind of society
which gives rise to a high number of researchers. We expect such society—or at
20
Table 2: Growth is predicted by research in Europe
A) Dep. var.: anualized p.c. GDP growth for the period indicated (× 100)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
1500-1913 1600-1913 1700-1913 1820-1913
Initial log p.c. researchers -0.00940 0.133∗∗∗ 0.167∗∗ 0.337∗∗∗∗
(0.0353) (0.0330) (0.0548) (0.0759)
Initial log p.c. GDP 0.0174 -0.525∗∗∗ -0.713∗∗ -0.328
(0.209) (0.139) (0.290) (0.196)
Maddison 2010 dummy 0.0242 0.0493 0.0556 0.262
(0.149) (0.0750) (0.103) (0.166)
Observations 10 13 12 18
R2 0.014 0.650 0.740 0.633
B) Dep. var.: researchers per capita in 1913
(1) (2) (3) (4)
1500-1913 1600-1913 1700-1913 1820-1913
Initial log p.c. researchers 0.256 0.354 0.361∗∗ 0.604∗∗∗∗
(0.219) (0.205) (0.123) (0.0909)
Observations 12 17 15 22
R2 0.077 0.183 0.363 0.721
Notes: OLS estimates with robust standard errors in parenthesis. Significance at the 10%, 5%, 1%,
and 0.1% levels are indicated by *, **, ***, and **** respectively. Source: See text.
least the intellectual elite of it—to have a comparatively high level of human capital
and the capacity to understand novel ideas from around the world.14
That said, the exact mechanism through which a higher researcher density might
lead to higher economic growth is not fully understood by us yet. Therefore may
propose this interpretation as an assumption for the remainder of this paper.
Assumption 2. The number of famous researchers per capita in a country or region serves
as a proxy of the intellectual capabilities of a society to adopt new technologies.
Summing up, the relative distribution of researchers across Europe was mostly
determined prior to 1820. After the modern growth regime took off, countries with
higher researcher densities experienced higher economic growth rates and the rank-
ing of income levels finally resembles that of per capita researchers.
What we have shown here is similar in spirit to a Granger causality test. The
research environment changed in a certain way, which was independent of income,
and income then reflected those changes. We may conclude as follows.
14See also Griffith et al. (2004).
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Conclusion 2. Across Europe, a higher relative number of researchers per capita, if main-
tained over time, caused higher economic growth in a country once the modern growth
regime began in 1820.
3.5 A world shaped by persistent researchers
Revisar HUN -> aut/hun
Conclusion 2 has important implications for what we expect to observe in other
samples. If the geographical distribution of researcher densities has remained rela-
tively constant since 1820, then we should be able to predict international modern
economic growth rates with the 1820 researcher densities. If the geographical distri-
bution of researcher densities has been relatively constant since even earlier dates,
then the densities of these earlier dates should be able to predict modern growth as
well.
We can see in figure 10a that for both, the European and the non-European sam-
ples, research allocation has been similarly persistent from the 18th to the 20th cen-
tury. And in figure 10b we see that this persistence is greater than that of income.
Figure 10: Worldwide GDP and research distribution since modern growth began
(a) 20th vs. 18th century researchers per capita
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Despite similarities since 1820, the European and worldwide stories will differ
substantially if we go further back to the 15th century. Panel A) of table 3 shows the
estimated correlation based on the following cross-country regression:
log 20th c. born researchers p.c. = const. + β log i-th c. born researchers p.c.,
i = 19, 18, 15
Columns (1) to (3) are restricted to the European sample. They show us that in
the continent there has been persistence of the density of researchers since the 19th
and 18th centuries, but not since the 15th century. This stands in contrast with
columns (4) to (6), where persistence of researcher densities across the world sample
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goes back even to the 15th century. This means that, while within Europe events
such as the Reformation and Counter-Reformation had enough strength to largely
overwrite the previous order, such changes must look minuscule in terms of the
global distribution of researchers.
Limitations of the number of recorded researchers born prior to the 15th century
do not allow us to go further back in time at a country level. It is clear, though,
that prior to the Renaissance the persistence should have been much weaker. Most
noticeable researchers during the Middle Ages were Muslims, and during the antiq-
uity they were Chinese, Greeks, and Indians. But since around 1500, today’s world
order of research—with Europeans and their descendants dominating the research
distribution—was already established.15
To be careful, it must be noted that relative living standards and technologi-
cal sophistication have been shown to be remarkably persistent as well.16 Hence,
anything that shows persistence through time—researcher densities included—may
does so as a result of any persistent unknown force that is driving income and ev-
erything that may come with it. To be sure that research is special indeed, and not
just as persistent as income, panel B) of table 3 shows the correlation of per capita
GDP in 2005 with per capita GDP of 1913, 1820, and 1500. What we see is that for
the world sample the persistence of researchers is greater than that of income.17 The
same holds for Europe in column (1) and (2). Only in column (3) we observe more
persistence of income than of researchers. But we saw previously that this has to do
with the great changes of research that took place in the continent between the 15th
and the 19th century, and that these changes actually gave shape to the future in-
come distribution that would emerge in Europe between 1820 and 1913, and which
roughly lasts until our days.
Fact 10. The relative distribution of researchers for the worldwide sample has been strongly
persistent since the 15th century. Its persistence is higher than that of per capita income.
It must be no surprise, then, that in figure 11 log income levels in 2005 across the
world strongly correlate with the log density of researchers going back to the 19th,
18th, 17th, 16th, and even 15th century.
Fact 11. A strong correlation is observed between current international income levels and
the historical densities of famous researchers as old as from the 15th century.
Putting these facts together we may conclude as follows.
15 In words of Needham (as quoted in Maddison, 1997): “When we say that modern science de-
veloped only in Western Europe in the time of Galileo during the Renaissance and the scientific
revolution, we mean, I think, that it was there alone that there developed the fundamental bases of
modern science, such as the application of mathematical hypotheses to Nature, and the full under-
standing of the experimental method, the distinction between primary and secondary qualities and
the systematic accumulation of openly published scientific data”.
16See Comin et al. (2010), Spolaore and Wacziarg (2013), and Nunn (2014).
17If income is measured with substantially more error than researcher densities, then this conclu-
sion does not hold. But if researchers are measured with substantially more error than income—the
most likely case, we believe—then the fact that researchers show more persistence that income is
even more telling.
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Table 3: The geographical persistence of research output
A) Per capita researchers born in the 20th century vs. those born in previous centuries
European countries All countries
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Born 19c. Born 18c. Born 15c. Born 19c. Born 18c. Born 15c.
Correlation 0.916∗∗∗∗ 0.775∗∗∗∗ 0.179 0.930∗∗∗∗ 0.838∗∗∗∗ 0.659∗∗∗
[23] [19] [13] [54] [36] [15]
B) Per capita GDP in 2005 vs. per capita GDP in previous years
European countries All countries
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
1913 1820 1500 1913 1820 1500
Correlation 0.760∗∗∗∗ 0.528∗∗ 0.529∗ 0.779∗∗∗∗ 0.575∗∗∗∗ 0.503∗
[23] [19] [13] [54] [36] [15]
Notes: Observations in brackets. Significance at the 10%, 5%, 1%, and 0.1% levels are
indicated by *, **, ***, and **** respectively.
Conclusion 3. Modern economic growth across the world can be predicted with the histor-
ical density of researchers, because its distribution has remained relatively stable since then.
Two notes of care may deserve mention with respect to fact 11 and conclusion 3.
First, we must remember that the quantitative relationship obtained is dependent
on assumptions 1a and 1b, where the strong form 1a is much less likely to hold.
Second, due to constraints on researcher and population data we left out some parts
of the world which, given the small sample of countries with researchers born in the
15h century, could easily leverage the estimated slope.
That said, it must be emphasized that conclusion 3 conditions the prediction
on persistence. If a country had a large researcher density during the pre-modern-
growth period but a low researcher density afterwards, we expect it to exhibit low
growth during the modern growth regime. Conversely, if a country had a low re-
searcher density prior to 1820 but a large researcher density afterwards, we expect
it to have experienced high economic growth rates during the modern growth era.
One further conclusion might be drawn from figure 11. Just how important has
the “culture of research” been for international economic growth? As presented in
figure 11b, the regression of 2005 log GDP per capita with respect to log per capita
researchers born in the 19th century has an R2 of about 70%. If it is taken into ac-
count that most researcher densities are historically determined largely by historical
accidents independently of income, then the fit suggest that about 70% of current in-
ternational income inequality may be due to unequal research intensities—or, more
precisely, due to what researchers per capita are actually proxying for.18 Admittedly,
18Of course, this metric is not filtering out the distortion brought about by measurement error nor
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this would be a definitive conclusion only if the explanatory variable is not just ex-
ogenous, but irrefutably a first order determinant of income, and uncorrelated with
other relevant factors as well.
that the research environment may have changed in the meantime, as the points of Indonesia (IDN),
Cuba (CUB), and South Africa (ZAF) illustrate. In that sense, 70% might be interpreted as a lower
bound if no “third factor” is causing a spurious correlation.
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Figure 11: 15th to 20th century researchers vs. 2005 income levels
(a) 2005 GDP p.c vs. 20th century research
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(b) 2005 GDP p.c vs. 19th century research
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(c) 2005 GDP p.c vs. 18th century research
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(d) 2005 GDP p.c vs. 17th century research
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(e) 2005 GDP p.c vs. 16th century research
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(f) 2005 GDP p.c vs. 15th century research
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Notes: Country labels are standard ISO 3166-1 codes, except for the aggregates of the former Soviet
Union (USSR), Czechoslovakia (CZEV) and Yugoslavia (YUGO). The straight line corresponds to the
OLS fit. Sources: See text.
26
3.6 Estimates of the researchers’ impact
Figure 11 already hints that historical densities of researchers must be related to the
uneven economic development across the world. What can we expect from a policy
promoting research in our days?
A first approximation the answer is given in our baseline cross sectional es-
timates shown in table 4. Each column contains the OLS estimate of the cross-
sectional relationship between 2005 GDP per capita as dependent variable and the
historical densities of famous researchers born in previous centuries, after control-
ling for a constant, initial income, a dummy indicating if initial income is from Mad-
dison (2010) instead of the 2013 revision, a dummy controlling for the spectacular
rise of East Asia, and one for the collapse of Eastern Europe.19 Formally:
ln GDP2005population2005 = const. + β ln
researchers bornith-century
populationith-century end
+ controls + residual (4)
i = 15, . . . , 19
One can notice that the coefficient of the researcher density is relatively homoge-
nous in magnitude—it makes little difference whether we use 15th or 19th century
researchers, because little changed in the relative distribution of famous researchers
after 1500—and highly significant. The estimates tell us that a country with twice
the number of per capita historical researchers is expected to have about 30% more
income today.
It should be noticed that doubling the number of researchers is not a utopian
task. Norway doubled its density first from 1860 to 1900 and then again from 1900 to
1980. And, echoing the Meiji Reformation, Japan incremented its density of famous
researchers between 1880 and 1920 by an impressive factor of 10.20 Even the US
came close to doubling its density of researchers between 1930 and 1980. However,
we should also emphasize that these post-1800 examples are exceptions to the rule.
Most countries did not experience substantial changes in their densities after 1800.
Indeed, the persistence of the densities over time explains why the coefficients of
table 4 are so close to each other. Many countries which climbed to top positions in
research densities even 5 centuries ago still remain at the top and have higher per
capita incomes than those that lagged behind in terms of research densities.
Fact 12. In the cross section of countries, the elasticity of per capita income today with
respect centuries-old per capita researchers is about 0.3.
But when, exactly, did the action happen? To explore the time-variant role played
by researchers for economic growth, we run the following rolling regressions, where
19Controlling for initial income is essential since it is well known that income has been remarkably
persistent through centuries (Comin et al. (2010)). We considered pertinent the inclusion of a dummy
for East Asia because of the remarkable achievement of the region, which may be a result of other
factors (notwithstanding the important role of research). We also decided to control for Eastern
Europe because of the still lasting economic impact of the Soviet collapse.
20These figures are in terms of the (NSF-articles) adjusted number of per capita researchers. Similar
results are obtained with unadjusted numbers.
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Table 4: Baseline cross-sectional regressions
Dep. var.: per capita income in 2005
15c. 16c. 17c. 18c. 19c.
Log p.c. researchers 0.307∗ 0.377∗∗∗ 0.260∗∗ 0.250∗∗∗∗ 0.310∗∗∗∗
(0.157) (0.110) (0.0929) (0.0646) (0.0618)
Log p.c. GDP 1.256∗ -1.201∗∗ 0.637 0.554∗ 0.454∗∗∗∗
(0.566) (0.541) (0.540) (0.275) (0.125)
Maddison 2010 dummy 0.611 -0.275 0.255 -0.00447 -0.612∗
(0.455) (0.255) (0.194) (0.129) (0.305)
East Asia dummy 0 0.457 0.0923 0.763∗∗ 0.729∗∗∗∗
(.) (0.459) (0.392) (0.315) (0.141)
Eastern Europe dummy 0.322 0 -0.0659 -0.0283 -0.117
(0.566) (.) (0.259) (0.104) (0.102)
Observations 15 17 25 36 54
R2 0.620 0.646 0.534 0.594 0.784
Notes: OLS estimates with robust standard errors in parenthesis. Significance at the 10%,
5%, 1%, and 0.1% levels are indicated by *, **, ***, and **** respectively. Sources: Per capita
GDP is latest available figure from Maddison (2010) or, if available, from the 2013 updates
of the Maddison Project (Bolt and Zanden, 2014) or Broadberry (2013).
t denotes the end year of economic growth and d the number of years of the period
analyzed: GDPtpopt
GDPt−d
popt−d
 1d · 100− 100 = constantt + βt,d ln researcherst−dpopt−d + controls + residual (5)
t = 1600, . . . , 2010
d = 20, 50, 100.
Since our focus is on the long-run component of GDP variation, we used HP-filtered
(λ = 1000) annual data available in the Maddison Project (Bolt and Zanden, 2014) or
Broadberry (2013).21 Also, in order to include a large number of observations prior
to 1820, we log-linearly interpolated values before applying the HP-filter. Figure
15 shows the interpolated and filtered data for a selected group of countries with
particularly long time series.
As controls we implemented the same as in table 4. The resulting βt,d are plotted
in figure 12. They tell us that the predictive power of researcher densities has been
unstable over time, with swings that can last over decades. They also tell us that,
since about 1800, the predictive power of researcher densities has been consistently
increasing over the long run.
21In addition we included GDP data from Maddison (2010) for France, Switzerland, Denmark,
Austria, Norway, and the Easter European 7 aggregate.
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Figure 12: Impact of log research density on long-term income growth rates
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(c) d = 100
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Notes: The plotted coefficient is the one of log research intensity of equation 5 with 95% confidence
intervals. Population is from Maddison (2010) and per capita GDP is from Bolt and Zanden (2014).
Missing values were replaced by the log-linear interpolation.
One way of partially avoiding the reliance on our cross-sectional correction against
overrepresentation is to exploit the time-series dimension of the data. This is done
in our second set of baseline estimates, presented in table 5. The functional form of
the OLS estimates is the following:
 GDPi,tpop.i,t
GDPi,t−d
pop.i,t−d

1
d
· 100− 100 =const. + αt + αi + β
(
ln researchersi,t−dpop.i,t−d − ln
researchers?i,t−d
pop.?i,t−d
)
+ τt
(
ln researchersi,t−dpop.i,t−d − ln
researchers?i,t−d
pop.?i,t−d
)
+ other controls + residual (6)
t = 1700, . . . 2010 d = 20, 50, 80, 100
Here i denotes the country, t denotes the year and d denotes the length of the
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growth period considered (20, 50, 80, and 100 years). The dependent variable is
again based on the interpolated and HP-filtered data mentioned previously, and is
presented for a number of countries and d = 50 in figure 16.22
In addition to country fixed effects (αi) and time fixed effects (αt), we controlled
for initial income as has become usual in the empirics of growth. We also controlled
for lagged growth, because long term growth is indeed persistent and a spurious
correlation could arise from its omission.
The term
researchers?i,t−d
pop.?i,t−d
denotes a benchmark similar to a research-density-frontier,
and corresponds to the average density of famous researcher among Italy, the UK,
France, Germany, and the Netherlands.23 Figure 17 shows the research gap for a
selected group of countries with particularly long time series. The coefficient of in-
terest are β, which captures the effect of filling the research gap, the time interaction
τ, and the coefficient of lagged income growth.
The resulting long term multipliers for the years 1820, 1913, and 2010 are shown
at the bottom of the table. The they tell us that the estimated impact went from close
to zero in 1820 to values that range from about 0.3 to about 0.7 in 2010, depending
on the value of d.
We suspect that the different impact one finds using longer or shorter intervals
of time simply reflects the fact that other growth-relevant events happened with
greater probability in larger time-intervals, eclipsing the role of past research.
A more flexible functional form for the time-varying impact is shown in figure
13, now based on a 10th degree time-polynomial. Again, we see that the impact of
research densities on income growth increase trough time, corroborating our cross-
sectional results.24
In sum, the panel estimates are very consistent with those obtained with the
cross sectional rolling estimates presented in figure 12.
Fact 13. Based either on cross sectional or on within country panel estimates, the elasticity
of income growth with respect to the relative number of researchers has been increasing since
1820, when it was close to zero. For 20-years growth it has risen to about 0.7% in our days,
while for 100-years growth it has risen to about 0.3%.
What could explain an increasing importance of researchers for subsequent eco-
nomic growth? For Maddison (1997), it was the “gradual infiltration of the scientific
22The figure shows that growth rates over 50 years have not been constant. Instead, they have been
gradually increasing during the modern growth regime, in contrast to Kaldor’s famous observation
of balanced growth. This is one reason for including time fixed effects. Another reason is that time
fixed effects might also account for research depreciation: older researchers can be systematically
underrepresented in the dataset.
23It is not necessarily the frontier, since some nations have surpassed this benchmark at times, but
it has lower variance than the actual frontier and it is, we believe, a relevant yardstick to compare the
research capabilities of any country. Population to construct the researcher densities is taken from
Maddison (2010). We used log-linear interpolations to fill missing population values.
24The only important additional insight is that the researchers’ impact on 20-years economic
growth has been weakened since about the 1970s—an interesting fact indeed, but which we will
not explore in detail now.
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Table 5: Baseline panel estimates
Dep. var.: Annualized growth rate of HP-filtered per capita GDP (×100)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
20 yr. 50 yr. 80 yr. 100 yr.
laggedLogResGap -6.221∗∗∗∗ -4.355∗∗∗∗ -3.007∗∗∗∗ -2.398∗∗∗∗
(0.822) (0.130) (0.0732) (0.0565)
laggedLogGDP -2.033∗∗∗∗ -1.590∗∗∗∗ -1.188∗∗∗∗ -1.047∗∗∗∗
(0.312) (0.0507) (0.0257) (0.0226)
interaction 0.00344∗∗∗∗ 0.00236∗∗∗∗ 0.00165∗∗∗∗ 0.00133∗∗∗∗
(0.000433) (0.0000686) (0.0000399) (0.0000306)
Impact in 1820 0.04 -0.05 -0.00 0.02
Impact in 1913 0.36 0.17 0.15 0.15
Impact in 2010 0.70 0.40 0.31 0.28
R2 0.59 0.83 0.90 0.94
Observations 11277 8734 7035 6185
Notes: The regressions include country-fixed-effects and time-fixed-effects. Missing GDP
and population observations are filled with log-linear interpolation. Data for the UK and
the Netherlands was inferred from the contribution of Great Britain and England, and of
Holland respectively. The regressions start with t = 1700. We omitted two countries, Iraq
and Libya, because of their unusual behavior of GDP, which was in both cases clearly hit
by exogenous shocks. Sources: See table 4.
Figure 13: 10th-order time polynomial
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approach into educational systems”. For Mokyr (2009) and Goldstone (2009) it was
the increasing interaction between science and production from the 18th century
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onwards. Also, we would like to add, it could have been the result of knowledge
accumulation which, after reaching a breaking point, spilled over to production. Be-
fore 1800, scientific knowledge available to mankind was relatively poor compared
with later standards and certainly did not provide much guidance to technologi-
cal improvements.25 But technology eventually became increasingly dependent on
scientific advances. This gradual change, we believe, may have been merely the
result of scientific knowledge being “big enough” as to spill over to economically
useful applications. Once technologies started to depend on science, the number of
people in a country capable of understanding the principles that govern technology
should have started to matter for technological adoption. And a higher density of
researchers should be a proxy of the density of people with such capacities.
How does this dynamic effect relate to our baseline cross-sectional estimates of
the elasticity of today’s income with respect to past researcher densities presented
in table 4? A simulation of the implied effect is resented in figure 14. We use the
100-years-growth estimate, because it arguably captures better the long-term effect
of the researcher density. The simulation shows how a country which would growth
at the median growth rate per year could have benefited from doubling the number
of per capita researchers in 1820. Its current income level would in such case be
about 30% larger than without the increased researcher densities, just in line with
our baseline cross-sectional estimates of the elasticity of current income levels with
respect to past researcher densities.
Figure 14: Simulation out from column (4) in table 5
32.3% higher −−−>
1
2
4
6
8
10
1820 1850 1875 1900 1925 1950 1975 2000
year
Income with median growth
If researchers p.c. doubled in 1820
Notes: The benchmark income level is computed as 1 times the median annual growth
factor of the HP-filtered interpolated GDP series.
Fact 14. Panel estimates controlling for past income and country and time fixed effect also
imply an elasticity of current income with respect to past researcher densities of about 30%.
25See Mokyr (1990).
32
A crucial question is what the researcher density is proxying for in all regressions shown so far. The answer is uneasy, because larges changes in the researcher
density tend to be persistent. How could we then distinguish between a “culture of research”—e.g. societies permeated with empiricism and mathematics—and, say,
policy driven research affecting just research indicators but not the society as a whole? The point is made clearer in grDiscAv1700_1990.eps
33
Figure 15: Interpolated per capita GDP
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Figure 16: 50 years per capita income growth
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Figure 17: Research gap
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3.7 On Northian institutions
In recent decades, the institutional view of economic growth advanced by Nobel
Laureate Douglass North and popularized by Acemoglu and Robinson (2013) has
gained great attendance in the scholarly debate. Given its prominence, we studied
the relationship that exists between famous researchers and some Northian propo-
sitions.
The central claim of Northian institutionalism is that rich economies grew pros-
perous mainly due to their effective protection of property rights. Without fearing to
lose their property, so the argument, people in these societies had greater incentives
to engage in investment and innovation, eventually leading to prosperity.
One of intitutionalists’ specific propositions is that the industrial revolution started
in Britain as a consequence of its Glorious Revolution of 1688. According to Ace-
moglu and Robinson (2013), after the Glorious Revolution, “[t]he government adopted
a set of economic institutions that provided incentives for investment, trade, and in-
novation. It steadfastly enforced property rights, including patents granting prop-
erty rights for ideas, thereby providing a major stimulus to innovation.” (p. 102)
Figure 18: The Glorious Revolution and research activity
−−− Glorious Revolution
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Notes: . Source: Own computation based on DBpedia.
If so, one could expect to see this reflected in the number of famous researchers
that appeared at that time in Britain. Figure 18 shows the evolution of the number
of researchers aged 20 to 70 in the United Kingdom and in the rest of Europe. Prior
to the Glorious Revolution, the number of famous researchers in the UK grew at
higher rates, both compared to its later performance as well as compared to their
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continental counterparts. Did the Glorious Revolution have a positive impact on
British research output? The answer is a clear no.
Fact 15. Compared to its previous growth performance and that of Continental Europe,
British research was not positively affected by the Glorious Revolution.
With respect to research, at least, the Glorious Revolution was not what made
Britain strong. Rather, it was the fact that, for whatever reason, British research
grew when continental Europe stagnated during the 17th century.
Institutionalist have further proposed that a higher degree of constraint to the
executive should lead to more economic growth, finding some empirical support
(Acemoglu and Johnson, 2005, Glaeser et al., 2004). To assess whether research sys-
tematically predicts growth once accounting for the institutional setting, we run
our baseline regressions, now including as a control the index of constraints to the
executive, which is available starting in 1800.
In figure 19 we present the results obtained after including the executive con-
straint as a control to the cross-sectional rolling regression (5). The upper row plots
the coefficient obtained for the researcher density, showing that the estimated trends
and magnitudes of the researchers’ impact are robust to the inclusion of the institu-
tional control. Meanwhile, the constraints to the executive, plotted in the lower row,
appear not significantly distinct from zero.
A similar exercise is presented in table 6, now with our baseline panel regression
including as control the index of constraints to the executive. Again, trends and
magnitudes of the researchers’ impact are robust to the inclusion of the institutional
control.26
Conclusion 4. Researcher densities predict modern growth after controlling for constraint
to the executive.
26 With regard to the coefficient of the institutional variable, the results are partly contradictory.
We suspect that part of the significance in the panel estimates is spurious. Constraints to the exec-
utive have risen over time in most countries, and so have economic growth rates too. But perhaps
both trends are driven by an exogenous factor. On the other hand, the cross sectional estimates of
constraints to the executive, a categorical variable, may show up not significantly different from zero
due to the imperfect measurement, what makes it hard to take a stand at all about the role that this
variable may has or not for economic development.
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Figure 19: Coefficients and confidence intervals of rolling cross-sectional estimates
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Sources: The executive constraint index is from the Polity IV database, version 2013 (Marshall et al.,
2013).
Table 6: Panel estimates controlling for constraints on the executive
(1) (2) (3) (4)
20 yr. 50 yr. 80 yr. 100 yr.
laggedLogResGap -6.630∗∗∗∗ -5.070∗∗∗∗ -3.959∗∗∗∗ -2.576∗∗∗∗
(1.617) (0.326) (0.322) (0.253)
interaction 0.00365∗∗∗∗ 0.00268∗∗∗∗ 0.00210∗∗∗∗ 0.00143∗∗∗∗
(0.000843) (0.000172) (0.000168) (0.000129)
laggedXconst 0.0170 0.0149∗∗∗ 0.0170∗∗∗∗ 0.0310∗∗∗∗
(0.0132) (0.00488) (0.00360) (0.00320)
Impact in 1820 0.01 -0.18 -0.14 0.02
Impact in 1913 0.35 0.07 0.05 0.15
Impact in 2010 0.70 0.33 0.26 0.29
R2 0.62 0.81 0.88 0.93
Observations 7246 4630 3133 2383
Notes: The regressions also control for country-fixed-effect, time-fixed-effects, and initial
per capita GDP. See details in table 5. Sources: The executive constraint index is from the
Polity IV database, version 2013 (Marshall et al., 2013).
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3.8 On human capital
Human capital—habitually measured as average years of schooling or average literacy—
has been widely used as an indicator of how well positioned a country is in order
to absorb technical change. The number of researchers per capita in a country, we
would like to argue, should as well provide an index of (upper-tail) human capital
and knowledge absorption potential—although it is naturally a measure of knowl-
edge creation as well. The idea behind this claim is that researchers must be familiar-
ized with the last development in their field, and hence should have the capabilities
to understand and possibly facilitate the adoption of new techniques developed
somewhere in the world. As researchers are commonly involved in teaching as
well, countries with high research density are likely to have also a high density of
particularly well educated population, capable of implementing new and old tech-
niques and even creating new ones. On the other hand, countries with high levels
of education should be more likely to produce famous researchers as well.
In fact, we found that the number of researchers per capita is strongly correlated
with two standard measures of human capital: schooling enrollment and years of
schooling, as exemplified in figures 20a and 20b.27
One natural interpretation of these close relationships is that high levels of mass
education are conductive to a high density of researchers. However, there might be
also a reverse causality—from researchers to mass schooling—, something to which
we will return below.
Fact 16. Since 1900, measures of human capital are strongly correlated with densities of
researchers across countries.
Does the strong correlation between schooling and researchers we observe since
1900 also hold prior to the industrial revolution? Cross country data of literacy and
years of schooling simply does not exist. What we might use instead is a raw proxy
of literacy: the percentage of people able to sign their name. Figure 21 presents this
measure for a small number of pre-modern economies for which this measure is
available. One can see that the per capita number of researchers and people sign-
ing their name are rather uncorrelated.28 This might be simply the result of scarce
data. Alternatively, it rather might been telling us that these measures correspond
to different things: the literacy proxy being a measure of broad education and the
density of researchers being a measure of upper-tail human capital. The latter inter-
pretation is consistent with recent work by Squicciarini and Voigtländer (2014), who
find in their analysis of 18th century French city-level data that subscriber density to
27The cross country correlation between the log per capita researchers aged 20 to 70 in 1900 and
schooling enrollment rates in the same year taken from Benavot and Riddle (1988) is over 0.8 (figure
20a). One also finds a similar correlation between the log of active per capita researchers and the hu-
man capital index of the Penn World tables 8.0 (figure 20b). These indicators are not just spuriously
correlated through GDP: the residuals of their regressions with respect to log GDP are significantly
correlated too.
28The correlation coefficient between the literacy indicator in 1500 and researchers per capita in
15th century is 0.23 (with a p-value of 0.56) and the one literacy indicator in 1800 and log researchers
per capita in 18th century is 0.52 (with a p-value of 0.15).
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Figure 20: Research intensity vs. human capital
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Wales as a proxy of the one for the UK. Sources: Primary enrollment rates of 1900 are from Benavot
and Riddle (1988). Human capital indexes of 1990 are from the Penn world tables 8.0. Populations
are from Maddison (2010). Researchers are from DBpedia.
the Encyclopédie —a proxy of upper-tail human capital—is uncorrelated with liter-
acy rates in that period. While in contemporary times the population-wide average
of human capital and the upper-tail average human capital are correlated across
countries, perhaps this was not the case in the past.
Fact 17. Previous to the industrial revolution, available measures of human capital are not
correlated with densities of researchers across countries.
Unfortunately, we do not have sufficiently long time series of schooling to per-
form the rolling regression and panel exercises that were possible with the exec-
utive constraints.29 Table 7 presents regressions similar to the one of column (5)
of the cross-sectional baseline regressions of table 4, but now controlling for hu-
man capital indicators. Columns (1) and (2) show that primary enrollment in 1940
and average years of schooling in 1960—captured by the PWT8.0 index of human
capital—are significant predicting 2005 income levels. However, as shown in the
remaining columns, when introducing 19th century researchers both measures of
average human capital turn non significant, while the impact of 19th century re-
searchers has a significance level below 0.1% and point estimates not far from that
estimated in column (5) of table 4
Fact 18. In the cross section, the historical density of researchers remains a robust predictor
of development after controlling for schooling.
29Using the PWT 8.0, which covers data starting in 1950, we get results similar to those obtained
in our polynomial panel regression despite issues of collinearity of the almost constant researcher
densities and the country specific dummies. The results are available upon request.
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Figure 21: The density of researchers and a proxy of literacy
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(b) Around 1800
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Notes: ∗ England and Austria-Hungary correspond to the geographical regions of the literacy proxy.
Researchers per capita correspond to those born in the respective centuries, corrected by English
speakers as discussed in section 2, divided by population at the end of the century. Sources: The
literacy proxy is from Allen (2003). Populations are from Maddison (2010). Researchers are from
DBpedia.
Combining the evidence shown so far—(i) income levels not predicting the emer-
gence of researchers prior to the industrial revolution, (ii) no significant correlation
between research density and literacy prior to the industrial revolution, (iii) high
persistence of the cross country density of researchers, (iv) a strong correlation be-
tween research density and average human capital measures after the industrial
revolution, and (v) research intensity strongly predicting income levels and growth
rates, even controlling for average human capital.—we might adventure to put for-
ward the following hypothesis:
Conjecture 3. Where researchers emerged, income level rose, eventually leading to high
levels of education of the society as a whole.
If this is correct, then the causality runs, at least historically, rather from research
to education than the other way around.
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Table 7: Schooling vs. researchers in income regressions
Dependent variable: log GDP per capita in 2005
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Prim. enrollment 1900 0.0116∗∗∗ 0.00658
(0.00393) (0.00510)
Log schooling index 1960 1.137∗∗∗ 0.356
(0.380) (0.339)
Log 19th-cent.-born researchers p.c. 0.302∗∗∗∗ 0.256∗∗∗∗
(0.0783) (0.0642)
Log GDP p.c. 1913 0.624∗∗∗∗ 0.650∗∗∗∗ 0.259 0.395∗∗
(0.162) (0.158) (0.173) (0.155)
Eastern Europe dummy -0.248 0 -0.120 0
(0.230) (.) (0.209) (.)
East Asia dummy 1.045∗∗∗ 0.769∗∗∗∗ 0.821∗∗∗∗ 0.571∗∗∗∗
(0.365) (0.211) (0.217) (0.152)
Observations 48 52 43 44
R2 0.681 0.732 0.788 0.813
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. Significance at the 10%, 5%, 1%, and 0.1% levels are
indicated by *, **, ***, and **** respectively. See details in table 4. Sources: Primary school enrollment
ratios are from Benavot and Riddle (1988), the human capital index is from the PWT8.0. More details
in table 4.
3.9 How GDP has taken shape
In our baseline cross-sectional estimates we used per capita GDP of 2005 as depen-
dent variable. How do the estimated coefficients change when using other years
for the left hand side GDP level? The answer to this question turned out to be a
mayor result on its own. First we ran regressions analogous to those in table 4 using
distinct dates for the dependent variable:
Log p.c. GDPt = const.t + λ
i
t Researchers p.c. in the i
th cent.
+γt Log p.c. GDPith cent. end
+µtMaddison Dummyith cent. end + residualt (7)
We plotted the estimated coefficient associated with research intensity λit against
the year of the dependent variable in panels (a) to (d) of figure 22. In an attempt
to rule out reverse causality, we restricted our analysis to the impact of research
intensity on income levels starting 100 years after the end of the century where the
researchers were born.
Interestingly, in all graphs we have a positive slope, indicating that the estimated
elasticity increases as time passes—e.g. the number of researchers per capita of the
16th century is more important for explaining the GDPs of 2000 than explaining
GDPs of, say, 1700. And the same counts for research intensities of other centuries.
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Figure 22: Impact of 15th to 18th century per capita researchers on latter income
(a) 15th century researchers
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(b) 16th century researchers
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(c) 17th century researchers
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(d) 18th century researchers
0
.
05
.
1
.
15
.
2
.
25
.
3
.
35
.
4
.
45
Co
ef
. o
f 1
8t
h 
ce
nt
. r
es
ea
rc
he
r d
en
.
1860 1880 1900 1920 1940 1960 1980 2000
Year of per capita GDP
Notes: Estimated coefficient associated with research intensity are obtained from regressions showed
in equation 7. All regressions include a constant, dummies for East Asia, Eastern Europe and the
Anglosphere, the initial Log GDP p.c. and the Log per capita researchers born in a certain century.
Sources: See table 4.
Since this is a striking fact, one may ask how robust this finding really is. To
the extent that GDP levels show some degree of persistence, one might think that
the initial GDP level one is controlling for explains more of the dependent variable
of (7) when the time distance between the dependent variable and the control is
smaller, while, when this distance is larger, any other regressor which is somehow
correlated with the dependent variable will gain importance. But this is not the case
Time-slopes do not vary substantially, as presented in table 8.
Fact 19. The more time passes between income and an earlier historical researcher density,
the stronger the cross-country relationship among them.
What explains fact 19? We interpret it as the conjunction of two previously noted
facts: persistent researchers per capita across countries (fact 10) and the rising im-
pact of researchers per capita on economic growth rates (fact 13).
Omitting the components which are homogenous across countries in order to
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Table 8: Time varying elasticity of per capita GDP with respect to past per capita
researchers
Dependent variable in panels a) and b): λit of equation (7).
a) Controlling for initial GDP
15th cent. 16th cent. 17th cent. 18th cent. 19th cent.
Slope 0.000519∗∗∗ 0.00124∗∗∗ 0.00135∗∗∗ 0.00160∗∗∗ 0.00377∗
Observations 41 36 26 14 4
b) Not controlling for initial GDP
15th cent. 16th cent. 17th cent. 18th cent. 19th cent.
Slope 0.000549∗∗∗ 0.000660∗∗∗ 0.00127∗∗∗ 0.00101∗∗∗ 0.00197
Observations 41 36 26 14 4
Notes: See text Sources: See table 4.
center our attention on international differences and using the common log approx-
imation of growth rates, we can express a cross country vector of economic growth
as
yt − yt−1 ≈ rtβt − γtyt−1, γt > 0, βt > 0, (8)
where yt stands for log GDP per capita, rt is the log researcher density. According
to fact 13 we have
∂βt
∂t
> 0
We might rewrite (8) as
yt ≈ rtβt + ρtyt−1, ρt = 1− γt (9)
Additionally, we have persistence of researchers per capita (fact 10). Ignoring a
trend and any stochastic component—for simplicity and without loss of generality—
, we have
rt = φtrt−1, 0 ≤ φt ≤ 1 (10)
Substituting (10) into (9),
yt = ρtyt−1 + φtβtrt−1, (11)
provides an explanation for fact 12: as rt shows persistence, one will encounter a
significative and positive correlation between current income levels and past levels
of research density.
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Now we can turn as well to an explanation of fact 19. In figure 22 we had shown
that the effect that research density of a particular century had on GDP gained force
as time passed, e.g. researchers per capita of the 16th century are more important
explaining GDP levels of 2005 than GDP levels of 1800.
Lagging (11) we obtain
yt−1 = ρt−1yt−2 + φt−1βt−1rt−2. (12)
Then, substituting (12) for yt−1 in 11 yields
yt = ρtρt−1yt−2 + (ρtφt−1βt−1 + φtφt−1βt)rt−2. (13)
For fact 19 to hold we need the coefficient accompanying rt−2 in (13) to be larger
than the coefficient accompanying rt−2 in (12), i.e.:
(ρtφt−1βt−1 + φtφt−1βt) > φt−1βt−1
φt
βt
βt−1
> γt. (14)
In words, for the research density to gain impact over time, we need the persistence
of researchers per capita (φt) times the growth factor of its impact on GDP (βt/βt−1)
to be greater than the convergence parameter (γt).
Is this condition likely to hold? First, if the density of researchers is not persis-
tent at all (φt = 0), then (14) cannot hold, i.e. φt > 0 is a necessary condition. But
we already know that, in practice, φt is relatively large even in long time intervals,
and that βt has experienced an increasing trend since 1800.
To test if condition (14) holds numerically we plot both φt
βt
βt−1 and γt against
time in figure 23 for periods of 20, 50 and 100 years of economic growth, using the
coefficients obtained for γt and βt from our cross-sectional rolling regressions and φt
obtained from a linear OLS regression of the log number of researchers with respect
to its lagged value (and a constant). The estimates depend on the time interval
studied, but in all figures we see that in general the condition holds through modern
history.
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Figure 23: Parameters φt
βt
βt−1 and γt of equation (14) for 20-years, 50-years and 100-
years economic growth rates
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Notes: φt,γt, and βt correspond to the HP-filtered (λ = 5000) series of the parameters obtained from
the rolling cross-sectional regression.
4 Conclusions
On February 12, 2016, a team of over 1000 physicists published that an observatory
in Louisiana had—after measuring distortions of time-space caused by two black
holes merging into one—for the first time in history been able to confirm the exis-
tence of gravitational waves (Abbott et al., 2016). This happened exactly 100 years
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after Albert Einstein predicted their existence. So, how much time may it still take
for commercial uses of such insights to emerge?
By the same token, when do we expect to see the economic fruits emerge out
of the research conducted during Renaissance? Immediately after? 100 years after?
5 centuries after? This is hard to answer. “If inventions were dated according to
the first time they occurred to anyone, rather than the first time they were actual
constructed, this period [, the Renaissance,] may be regarded just as creative as the
Industrial Revolution.” (Mokyr, 1990, p. 58).
However, we know that countries where the Renaissance took place are still
among those with the highest numbers of researchers per capita. We therefore ex-
pect the population of these countries to have been continuously irrigated with new
insights about nature, and we expect there to have been people in these societies
that have understood these insights and may eventually have used them for their
economic benefit. It is not hard to imagine a first self-sustained nuclear reactor ap-
pearing in Berlin, Paris, Rome, or Wien instead of Chicago. But does the same count
for, say, Caracas? Didn’t Venezuelans—which by 1940 had a higher income per
capita than Austria, France, and Italy (Maddison, 2010)—lack, above all, the critical
amount of engineers and physicists for such achievement? Yes, we believe. And
the reasons behind such uneven endowment of high-qualified human capital lie, it
seems, in the centurial history of research.
A selected number of economic historians—Joel Mokyr, David Landes, Mar-
garet Jacob, and Jack Goldstone, among them—have put the development of science
and research at the center of the history of economic growth. But their “pumpkin
books”—as McCloskey (2010) refers to them, because they are big like a “prize-
winning pumpkin”—are packed with a detailed historiographical narrative, whose
actual economic impact is not easy to compare with the empirical economic litera-
ture. Our work instead provides, so to say, a “pumpkin pill”—a concise, assessable,
and easy digestible quantification of the “pumpkin narrative”. Yet, at the same time,
it unveils a number of facts beyond the message of these authors.
How much did we learn from ingesting this pill? First, we can clearly state that
research has been mostly exogenous to income. Research grew at modern rates be-
fore modern economic growth began—namely during the Renaissance and during
the century before 1820. The current number of researchers per capita was deter-
mined for most countries before income exploded. And we showed how significant
and long-lasting the changes of the research atmosphere in Europe during the Ref-
ormation and Counter-Reformation were, a period to which economic historians
have perhaps not paid the attention it deserves.
Second, we learned that placing research at the heart of economic development
and international income inequality, as done by Kuznets, Mokyr and a number of
growth theorist, is consistent with the data: research predicts international differ-
ences of long-term economic growth, and so more than the main factors proposed
by the empirical literature: schooling and executive constraints.
The R2 of the cross-country regression of 2005 log income with respect to the 19th
century researcher density alone is about 0.7. Hence, we may venture to conclude
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that about 70% of current income inequality is due to the history of research. How-
ever, this will be the case only if the explanatory variable is exogenous, highly rele-
vant, and uncorrelated with other relevant factors. As we saw, exogeneity seems to
be the case indeed, since historical accidents exogenous to income have been the pri-
mary forces determining the geographical distribution of researchers. Nonetheless,
model uncertainty in general and, in particular, the omission in our study of some
alternative explanations of industrialization, such as the development of trade, the
rise of the consumer society, and the role of manufacturing-based industrialization,
threatens the validity of such a conclusion, if these factors are shown to be collinear
with the researcher densities. Indeed, successful countries did not only invest heav-
ily in research, but also bet on manufactures and global markets. It is questionable,
though, whether Germany, for instance, would have become such a large exporter
of a complex array of manufactures without its history of research, or whether the
East Asian miracle would have been possible without heavy research efforts.
Lastly, we learned that there has been a dynamic impact of research on economic
growth and have a quantitative estimate of it. From the times of Francis Bacon—
who in the early 17th century was already convinced of the role that research had for
economic growth—to our days the impact, though volatile, has been consistently on
the rise. Today, for a country which manages to double its number of researchers
per capita in a few decades (as was done by Japan and others), per capita GDP may
be expected to grow at almost 1% more during the next twenty years.
Beside the main results, this work also hinted to specific conjectures that need
more study to be conclusive and found empirical regularities with no obvious ex-
planation. What are researcher densities precisely proxying for? In other words,
what is the specific mechanism through which societies with more researchers end
up having more economic growth? Why, if income and population growth have
been shown to play a minor role, have researchers worldwide grown at a constant
rate since the early 18th century? Could it be that research has its own endogenous
balanced growth path, e.g. a combination of new research horizons building on pre-
vious research but limited by human rational capabilities? What has driven some
societies to produce more research than others? And is the relative constancy of eco-
nomic growth rates in the advanced nations the result of almost constant growth of
researchers worldwide? These are just a few of many questions still to be answered.
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Appendix A Data appendix
A.1 Construction of the uncorrected database
The raw, unadjusted, database was constructed between October 2014 and February 2015 out of
queries from DBpedia (dbpedia.org/), a repository containing structured metadata gathered from
the English version of Wikipedia. The definition of researcher we employed corresponds to a person
engaged in work aimed at increasing the stock of what one might call—following Kuznets (1966)—
“useful knowledge”, including all branches of theoretical and applied science, mathematics, and phi-
losophy, but excluding arts and religious studies. Trying to match this definition, we first retrieved
metadata from profiles of people tagged in DBpedia as “scientist”, “philosopher”, “inventor”, or
“intellectual”.30 Some of these persons were rather artists, religious figures, politicians, or national
heroes, so that we kept only those with a research-related “shortDescription”—i.e. one containing
words such as “researcher”, “astronomer”, “biologist”, and the like.31 Subsequently we performed
further extensive inspection of the data for two reasons. First, since the metadata of Wikipedia is
constructed out of an ample communitarian effort, we expected an important part of the data to be
erroneous.32 To our surprise, however, the appearance of vandalized articles was almost nil and the
quality of the data proved to be high, since most of our conclusions changed little after months of
intensive data cleaning. Second, as our goal has been to perform cross-country analysis, historical
places of birth needed to be matched with contemporary geographical limits. Here our criteria was
to assign nationalities to people born before modern limits according to their ethnicity or, in cases
we find it more appropriate, the university where they taught for most of their life.33 It is worth
noting that migration is often not taken into account in the national categorization of the data: an
Hungarian-born young scientist that migrated to the US during World War II, for instance, might be
assigned to Hungary despite having been active mostly in the US.
We were particularly meticulous revising the data of people born before 1900, as data going back
in time gets scarcer and results based on them more sensitive to sampling errors. Up to those born
30We started only with scientists first but noticed that further “types” were needed to include some
ancient researchers which were tagged as philosophers, important contributors to engineering which
were tagged as inventors, and other scientists labeled as intellectuals but not considered elsewhere.
Miguel Servet, for instance, the first European who correctly described the function of pulmonary
circulation, was only to be found in the category “intellectual”.
31Albert Einstein, for instance, is kept because its short description is “Physicist”, while Ernesto
Guevara—who is strangely also tagged as “Scientist”—is dropped, as its short description is
“Argentine-born Marxist, politician, and leader of Cuban and internationalist guerrillas”. This filter
even dropped Benjamin Franklin, who’s short description is “American printer, writer, politician”.
In order to avoid dropping very important researchers we compared our data with the 100 most
influential scientists of all time of Britannica Encyclopedia [Rogers (2010)] and two similar lists [Sim-
mons (2000), Tiner (2000)]. All but 13 out of 240 scientists of these lists were in the filtered database.
They were naturally added to the definitive dataset.
32 Wikipedia provides a review of third-party studies assessing their data reliability in http://en.
wikipedia.org/wiki/Reliability_of_Wikipedia
33both ancient Greeks scattered around the Mediterranean and Byzantine Greeks were assigned to
Greece; Indians born in current day Pakistan or Bangladesh were assigned to India; Transylvanians
were assigned to Hungary or Romania according to their ethnicity; Italians living in colonies of the
Republic of Venice were assigned to Italy; Turks from around the Ottoman empire were assigned to
Turkey while Arabs were assigned to current day nations; ethnical Germans from all over Europe
were assigned to Germany; people from Austria-Hungary were assigned to countries where one find
their ethnicity today; Bosnians, Croats, Macedonians, Montenegrins, Serbs, and Slovenians were
assigned to Yugoslavia; Slovaks and Czechs were assigned to Czechoslovakia; English, French or
Dutch colonizers born in Africa, Asia, or the Americas but which returned to Europe were assigned
to their European precedence country; some Armenians were included into Turkey despite later
genocide, while some other were assigned to Azerbaijan.
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in the 18th we were able to inspect manually their birthcountries and the general validity of their
metadata, but due to the scale of the dataset, we had to restrict ourselves to selective checking of
researchers born in the 19th century (just focusing on countries with small numbers of researchers)
and relied exclusively on programming filters for those born in the 20th century.
One difficult task was to determine to which extent religious scholars were to be considered
researchers or not. The clergy in Europe and Asia alike was responsible for the safeguarding of
countless ancient scripts, including medical studies, philosophical writings and historical resources.
Also, during periods such as Arab Al-Andalus or the European Renaissance, people engaged in reli-
gious studies were particularly prone to research other areas of scientific interest, so that the presence
of influential religious figures may well have been correlated with higher degrees of philosophical
and scientific sophistication. Our approach, however, was to keep religious scholars out of the data
if they did not arguably made any substantial contribution to areas of knowledge beyond religion
itself.
The resulting dataset contains more than 40,000 researchers distributed in time and research cat-
egories as presented in table A1.34 One can note that 28% of researchers born prior to the year 1500
were tagged as philosophers, a number that falls to less than 10% since the 17th century. As noted
above, it was important to include this category, since people such as Thales or Pythagoras, for in-
stance, appear as philosophers but not as mathematicians. While it might be that the importance of
philosophers in the generation of “useful knowledge” has declined over time as science has gradu-
ally drifted apart from philosophy, we decided to keep them uninterruptedly to avoid an artificial
brake in the time series and also because it is hard to determine when—if indeed—philosophy ended
to be a significant input to technological advances.
Table A1: Researchers by birthdate
<1500 15th c. 16th c. 17th c. 18th c. 19th c. 20th c.
Number of researchers 334 138 448 702 2944 12279 23803
Scientists1 and mathematicians 63% 61% 73% 78% 78% 80% 84%
Applied scientists2 and inventors 11% 12% 19% 16% 20% 21% 16%
Philosophers 28% 12% 10% 9% 5% 3% 4%
Other scholars3 13% 30% 16% 11% 8% 6% 8%
Res. with identified birthplace 310 125 430 675 2862 11603 21742
Percentage 0.93 0.91 0.96 0.96 0.97 0.94 0.91
Notes: 1 denotes natural and social scientists. 2 denotes physicians and engineers. 3 denotes re-
searchers with ambiguous descriptions such as “Nobel laureate”, “Italian humanist”, or “German
professor”. Because some researchers were active in more than one field, the percentages sum up to
more than one. Source: Own computations based on DBpedia.
From all researchers, about 35,000—roughly 86% of the whole database—have identified birth-
places and can thus be used in cross sectional analysis. This share increases to almost 100% for
researchers born prior to the 19th century as a result of our one by one checking of those researchers.
Prior to the 15th century the median number of famous researchers per country is low —even in
countries who do have research activity the median number per century is just one at that point—,
hence one must abdicate from using cross country indicators that go that far in the past.
The table also shows how the number of researchers increases exponentially over time—and so
does the reliability of the cross country indicators as well.
Figure 24 shows the number of researchers aged 20 to 70 (including deceased ones) through time
34As some researchers might appear in more than one category, percentages added vertically in
the table do add up to more than 100%.
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Figure 24: Researchers aged 20-70 worldwide (not adjusted for geographical biases)
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Source: Own computation based on DBpedia.
A.2 Comparison to alternative sources
The world aggregate and the takeoff of research. Figure 25 presents a comparison between the ag-
gregate series based on DBpedia and on Gascoigne (1984)—to the best of our knowledge, the largest
catalogue of scientist available for early modern times. It shows that the main messages of DB-
pedia, namely that worldwide researchers exploded between the 15th and 16th centuries, grew at a
lower rate during the 17th century, and exhibited steaty-state growth afterwards, is mirrored by Gas-
coigne’s data. Gascoigne (1992) shows how his series presented in figure 25, which is based on a list
of 12,338 scientists born between 1410 and 1860, also closely mimics the evolution of other sources,
such as that Dictionary of Scientific Biographies, which includes 3062 scientists for that period, and
his Chronology of the History of Science, which contains just 1000 scientists. His analysis has im-
portant implications. It tells us that measures of research output are highly correlated. Therefore,
conclusions drawn from DBpedia data, which is subject to an arbitrary “entry barrier”, are likely to
extend to databases with more researchers as well. Smaller datasets will, of course, present higher
variance and tend to be less reliable for econometric estimates.
Colocar tambien DSB y Bohrman?
Research within countries. Figure 26 shows the evolution in time of the number of researchers
across some Western countries. It presents, again, data of Gascoigne (1984) but also the much more
restrictive data of Murray (2003), which is based on about 1000 “great minds” of science previous
to 1900, hence representing the most significant figures contained in Gascoigne and DBpedia. When
differences emerge between Gascoigne’s data and DBpedia, we can see that the reason is that DBpe-
dia tracks more closely the evolution captured by Murray in some cases. In other words, DBpedia
data lies somewhere between Gascoigne (1984) and Murray (2003).35
Figure 27 compares the number of researchers in a selected group of Western countries with data
of Murray (2003). As in figure 5 , Britain dominates the research landscape between 1650 and about
1850, closely followed by France and Germany, while Italy falls behind. Similar developments can
be found in figure 28, albeit with an overrepresentation of German scientists, which is due to the
“strength of the German tradition of comprehensive biography”, as Gascoigne (1992) acknowledges.
Research across countries. Figure 29 shows the cross sectional relationship between DBpedia
and Gascoigne (1984). Further graphical comparison of DBpedia with alternative metrics of research
can be found in figures 30a, 30b and 30c. Figure 30a plots the number of active researchers per
35Gascoigne, 1992 acknowledges some biases in its sampling of researchers. One is the overrep-
resentation of German scientists due to the “strength of the German tradition of comprehensive
biography”.
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Figure 25: The world aggregate
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Notes: Gascoigne’s data is presented as a three-decades moving average of people born in a decade,
as presented in Gascoigne (1992), but lagged 40 years in order to present people with 40 years in-
stead of newly born to-be researchers. DBpedia data corresponds to researchers aged 20 to 70. Both
series are normalized to 100 in 1700. Sources: Gascoigne (1984) (as in Gascoigne, 1992) and own
computation based on DBpedia.
capita in 2005 from DBpedia against the one provided by the UNESCO for the World Bank’s World
Development Indicators (WDI). We do not expect a perfect fit among both measures. Researchers
appearing in Wikipedia must be famous, so that the DBpedia-based metric is an output indicator.
On the contrary, researchers appearing in official statistics need not to be associated to any known
significant production. Official numbers of researchers are rather an input indicator. Yet, despite
differences such as a clear underrepresentation of East Asia in DBpedia, we do observe a relationship
with almost unitary elasticity, as would be expected from an unbiased indicator.
A similar comparison is made in figure 30b. It plots for year 1981 the number of researchers per
capita from DBpedia against the number of scientific articles per capita provided by the National
Science foundation (NSF). Now being both output indicators, the fit is considerably better.
And a comparison with earlier historical densities of researchers is provided in figure 30c. It
presents the per capita number of researchers born in the 19th century according to DBpedia against
the same number according to Murray (2003), which condenses 34 sources of the history of science.
Albeit some differences (Murray’s data is based on 10 times less researchers), a marked positive
relationship between the two sources can be observed.
referirse a que no ompartimos ideologia con murray?
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Figure 26: Gascoigne (1984), Murray (2003), and DBpedia
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Notes: The series are normalized to 100 for the maximum in 1850 (not per country), being therefore
comparable across countries. Gascoigne’s data is presented as a three-decades moving average of
people born in a decade, as presented in Gascoigne (1992), but lagged 40 years in order to present
people with 40 years instead of newly born to-be researchers. DBpedia and Murray’s data corre-
spond to researchers aged 20 to 70. Sources: Gascoigne (1984) (as in Gascoigne, 1992), Murray (2003),
and own computation based on DBpedia.
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Figure 27: Researchers aged 20-70 in selected countries. Murray’s (2013) data.
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Figure 28: Researchers aged 40 in selected countries. Gascoigne HCS
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Figure 29: Researchers per capita in 1820. Gascoigne vs. DBpedia
(a) Researchers in 1820 (logscale)
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(b) Researchers per capita in 1820 (in logs)
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Figure 30: Unadjusted DBpedia log researchers per capita vs. . . .
(a) . . . log UNESCO researchers p.c., 2005
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(b) . . . log scientific articles, 1981
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(c) . . . log scientists p.c., 19th cent.
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Notes: Researchers from DBpedia correspond to those aged 20 to 70 in a given year. Sources: UN-
ESCO researchers and NSF articles are from World Bank (2016), scientists are from Murray (2003),
population is from Maddison (2010), and researchers correspond to own computations out of DB-
pedia.
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A.3 Correction of the database
However, even a perfect fit in figure 30c would not mean that the data is unbiased. The work of
Murray has indeed been accused of “exaggerated Eurocentrism” (Tetlock and Parker, 2006, p. 5).
And, of course, Eurocenstrism—or, more generally, a bias towards high income countries—is a seri-
ous threat for studying the relationship between researchers and subsequent economic development
when relying on cross-sectional regressions. In such case a positive relationship between income and
research could arise solely out of reverse causality, as shown schematically in equation (15):
Income today ↑⇒ DBpedia use ↑⇒ researchers in all years ↑ (15)
Is Wikipedia biased towards higher income countries? It sounds plausible that an average editor
of Wikipedia is more likely to write about researchers from his country than about researchers from
other parts of the world. Therefore, as our data is based on entries made by editors of the English
Wikipedia and because internet penetration is stronger in higher income countries, a sampling bias
could potentially arise in the form of an overrepresentation of researchers from countries with high
income and high shares of English-speaking population.
To inspect the degree of such potential biases we may look at how close DBpedia researchers are
tracking other similar measures which are definitively not affected by these potential biases. One
such measure should be the official number of per capita researchers which we introduced in figure
30a. Also the number of articles per capita of the NSF presented in figure 30b might be a valid proxy
of an unbiased point of comparison.
A statistical comparison between these alternative proxies of research and the DBpedia index is
presented in panels A, B and C of table A2. In columns (1) to (4) of panel A the log difference in
4 different years between the researcher density based on DBpedia and the number of articles per
capita is regressed with respect to log per capita GDP of 2010, a dummy for East Asia, and a constant.
The same is done in columns (5) to (7), with the dependent variable being now the log difference
between the researcher density based on DBpedia and the one based on official statistics for three
different years. All these regressions are aimed at showing whether there is an overrepresentation of
high income countries in DBpedia. But the coefficient is negative or not significantly different from
zero. Hence, high income countries are not overrepresented in DBpedia.
A similar comparison is made in panel B, now adding as regressors the intensity of internet
users and a set of regional and linguistic dummies. Surprisingly, neither are the Eastern European
block and French speaking countries underrepresented, nor is the Anglosphere (USA, UK, Canada,
Ireland, Australia, and New Zealand) overrepresented.
It would be desirable to control for the number of editors of Wikipedia in each country or, at
least, for the number of English speakers. But, unfortunately, there are no reliable statistic on either
of both measures. To the best of our knowledge, the only comparable metric of English speakers is
the one provided by the Eurobarometer of the European Commission, covering just some European
countries. Panel C presents how this measure relates to the same dependent variable as in the pre-
vious panels. Except for column (1), the more English speakers a country has, the more represented
are their researchers in Wikipedia.36 Therefore, table A2 suggest no systematic overrepresentation of
high income countries, but a significant underrepresentation of East Asian countries and countries
with few English speakers. This means we cannot compare the UK with, say, China or France, unless
we perform a correction of these biases.
When performing comparisons among European countries, we will employ correction (1) of the
density of researchers, repeated here for convenience, at any point in time:
Adjusted log researchers p. c.t = Unadjusted log researchers p. c.t
+ (100−% English speakers)× 0.0125 (1)
where the number 0.0125 corresponds to the average of columns (2) to (7) in panel C of table A2. We
will refer to this adjustment as the English-correction.
36Using less reliable sources with intercontinental coverage, such as Crystal (2003) or the English
Profilency Index, produce almost the same coefficient. Results can be provided upon request.
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When making comparison among countries of the entire sample we will employ the alternative,
suboptimal (less precise), correction instead. It is based on the residuals of regression (2):
DBpedia log researchers p. c.t = const. + NSF log articles p. c.t
+ residualt, t = 1986, . . . , 2000 (2)
These capture the average degree of over or underrepresentation in DBpedia with respect to the
density of articles according to the NSF.37 The adjusted metric, to which we will refer to as NSF-
correction, is thus
Adjusted log researchers p. c.t = Unadjusted log researchers p. c.t
− average residual of (2) . (3)
37The choice of a metric based on NSF articles instead of a metric based on UNESCO researchers
is because the latter offers to few observations.
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Table A2: Are there any biases?
A) Is there an income bias?
ln(DBpedia res. p.c. / NSF art. p.c.) ln(DBpedia / UNESCO res. p.c.)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
1981 1990 2000 2005 1996 2000 2005
ln(GDP/pop) 2010 0.0661 -0.445∗∗∗∗ -0.566∗∗∗∗ -0.545∗∗∗∗ 0.139 0.101 0.127
(0.156) (0.0894) (0.0899) (0.0807) (0.177) (0.136) (0.107)
East Asia dummy -0.0867 -0.397 -1.070∗∗∗ -1.339∗∗∗∗ -1.591∗∗∗∗ -2.013∗∗∗∗ -2.472∗∗∗∗
(0.453) (0.359) (0.387) (0.347) (0.365) (0.333) (0.331)
Observations 40 95 96 96 32 41 49
R2 0.006 0.227 0.347 0.406 0.403 0.493 0.549
B) Are there other biases?
ln(DBpedia res. p.c. / NSF art. p.c.) ln(DBpedia / UNESCO res. p.c.)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
1981 1990 2000 2005 1996 2000 2005
ln(GDP/pop) 2010 0.225 -0.161 -0.160 -0.335 -0.475 0.0919 0.189
(0.317) (0.227) (0.229) (0.207) (0.464) (0.367) (0.292)
Internet users in 2013(%) -0.00969 -0.0154 -0.0219∗∗ -0.0127 0.0195 -0.000621 -0.00304
(0.0140) (0.00984) (0.0101) (0.00916) (0.0165) (0.0153) (0.0118)
Anglosphere dummy 0.0240 0.190 0.352 0.420 0.656 0.399 0.421
(0.432) (0.481) (0.496) (0.450) (0.453) (0.447) (0.390)
Francophone dummy 0.338 0.617 0.693 0.618 -0.191 -0.218 -0.334
(0.576) (0.562) (0.670) (0.607) (0.622) (0.541) (0.484)
Eastern Europe dummy -0.0364 1.149∗ 0.734 0.770 -0.327 -0.486 -0.388
(0.660) (0.631) (0.567) (0.514) (0.503) (0.508) (0.464)
East Asia dummy -0.0656 -0.334 -1.023∗∗∗ -1.268∗∗∗∗ -1.528∗∗∗∗ -2.015∗∗∗∗ -2.483∗∗∗∗
(0.488) (0.361) (0.387) (0.351) (0.384) (0.358) (0.347)
Observations 40 95 96 96 32 41 49
R2 0.030 0.277 0.391 0.435 0.506 0.527 0.578
C) English speakers in Europe
ln(DBpedia res. p.c. / NSF art. p.c.) ln(DBpedia / UNESCO res. p.c.)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
1981 1990 2000 2005 1996 2000 2005
English speakers (%) -0.00415 0.00681 0.0102 0.0115∗ 0.0170∗∗∗ 0.0171∗∗ 0.0125∗∗
(0.00863) (0.00888) (0.00745) (0.00653) (0.00499) (0.00706) (0.00526)
Observations 19 21 21 21 14 16 21
R2 0.013 0.030 0.091 0.140 0.492 0.294 0.230
Notes: OLS estimates with robust standard errors in parentheses. Significance at the 10%, 5%, 1%,
and 0.1% levels are indicated by *, **, ***, and **** respectively. Constants included but omitted in
the table. In terms of ISO-3166 countrycodes, the dummies are conformed by the following. East
Asia: HKG, MAC, JPN, KOR, PRK, VNM, SGP, THA, IDN, MYS, KHM, and TWN; Anglosphere:
USA, GBR, CAN, AUS, IRL, and NZL; Eastern Europe: CZEV, CZE, BGR, POL, EST, LTU, LVA,
RUS, UKR, ROM, HUN, BLG, ALB, SVK, SVN, HRV, YUG, BIH, YUGO, USSR, EEC, SRB, ROU;
Francophone: FRA LUX MCO BEL MUS AND; Sources: Per capita income levels are from the Penn
World Tables (PWT) 8.0. Population levels are from Maddison (2010). Internet users per capita are
from the WDI. Researchers are from DBpedia and from the WDI.
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